I agree that the Jewish Israelis getting Jerusalem at long last may be a breath of fresh air for the entire ethnoreligious conflict that has gone on for a full century or more.

My supposition, however, is that, by the time Israel does get Jerusalem, the strongly-growing Hardal (Orthodox Nationalist) demographic will have gotten closer to control of the government, or at least be able to withstand stuff like disengagement from settlements. At that point, I’m sure that they will gravitate towards making Israel a halakhic state (halakha being the Jewish version of Muslim sharia in the latter’s most generic sense), or at least make explicit the state’s preferential relationship with Judaism in a similar explanation as that used in most predominately-Muslim countries.

I think it would be natural for that to happen, though. Judaism shares much more in common with *classic* Islam than it does with any shade of Christianity, particularly in dietary laws and strength of religious self-identification. Furthermore, before the destruction of Judah, historical Judaism had enjoyed a strong kinship with the state, and future self-governments also were heavily involved with Jewish institutions, and vice versa. Of course, I’m a secular humanist, but I can understand why Israel is heading down that path. As Israel/Judah/Iudaea and Judaism had a strong relationship, the frequent, sudden depositions of the state left the surviving people stranded of any cohesive ethnic identification save with Judaism; and as they moved to Europe and settled in ancient Germany, those who practiced Judaism were ethnically identified with (and violently targeted for) their religion by non-Jewish Germans, and then other Europeans, and they imported the ethnoreligious consciousness back to Israel, where it is slowly reverting to its true form as a state-preferred religion.

In both predominately Muslim and predominately Jewish countries, anyway, it is hard to define such a thing as laicite or separation of church and state in a way that is culturally parsible. Other than the communists, national-socialists, labor socialists and anarchists in these countries, there’s hardly any true identification of home-grown, indigenous secular anti-clericalism like – or unlike – whatever that has been tried in the Western world (secularism in Israel seems to be more of a holdover from the Jewish ethnic experience with the Enlightenment and subsequent movements in Europe, and not something that could seriously retain a governing role in a country that is ultimately, steadily gravitating towards a religiously-grounded governance and state character).

That’s not to say that it is a "bad thing" for Israel to gravitate towards theocracy – unfortunate, yes, but not the sort of threat that Judeophobic conspiracy theorists make it out to be. Israel was particularly deprived of its history by past events, and trying to rebuild and make connections with its last existence as a contiguous ethnic homeland – even if its by making that connection with its last time as a homeland of the Jewish religion (A.D. 70) – is a very hard thing to do, but something that will allow them to mature as a nation.

Furthermore, I think that an indigenous, time-tested secularism will arise in Israel after a long period of Haredi theocratic rule under halakha; at best, since populist pro-theocracy movements arise out of, or in reaction to, similar circumstances that result in the production of populist nationalist or populist republicanist movements in other countries, theocracy seems to be a logical, therapeutic system of governance for Israel, one that will produce a homegrown, reactive secularism far into the future. Iran is having a similar experience, and it is possible that other predominately Muslim countries will gravitate towards more native implementations of state secularism akin to Kemalist Turkey.

But Israel, like any other sovereign nation-state, should be able to take its time in consideration of such a future secularism, and should not be stamped upon by the European Union members with some non-native secularism that hardly addresses the most keen distresses which have formed part of the Jewish nationalist dialogue for a century and a half. It would be as presumptuous and ill-thought for the EU, UN or US to compel Israel against its movement toward theocracy as it would be to pressure Iran against a strongly similar movement.

If I’ve learned anything from Israel as a Jewish state, it’s to not enmesh my ethnicity or nationality into my religion, or vice versa. Doing so in order to keep my cultural affinity intact may seem like a good idea while in diaspora without a homeland, but when I or my descendants come back to that country, they will not only clash with those of other religious persuasions for political ascension, but they will also struggle to reclaim their secular ethnic consciousness away from the predominant religion (upon which their ancestors relied in times past)…perhaps for the next few centuries*. It would just seem like a huge cultural mess.

* – which is odd since Bosniaks are also routinely called "Bosnian Muslims" or merely "Muslims", as if "Muslim" is their ethnicity.