Category Archives: Uncategorized

Haredi autonomy/federation in Israel

 I think that Haredi autonomy or self-governance in Israel is a likely event, be it in a one-state or two-state solution. To that end, I propose a "Haredi Autonomous Area" or "Haredi Province" that will govern South and Jerusalem Districts under a stricter interpretation of Halakhah. In this way,

  • the Haredi sector of the Israeli population will tend to their own affairs with their own regional Knesset (and Sanhedrin, if they prefer), letting the secular, atheist and liberal population remain in the Gush Dan under their own laws.
  • the Haredim will become the face (and, if necessary, force) of the Israeli Hebrew side of the dispute over Jerusalem and Judea (southern bulge of the West Bank), letting secular nationalists (Hilonim Leumim) in Israel concentrate more upon their own affairs and less upon defending face for erstwhile theocrats (ranging from Hasidics to Kahanists) who could care less for "liberals" and the "left fifth column".

This idea is not intended to bring stability to the state, but rather to concentrate the fight between Hebrew-speaking Jews and Arabic-speaking Muslims in the southern portion of the country, while letting the dispute over Samaria/Shomron (northern West Bank) be settled between Gush Dan migrants and Arab residents without as much of the religiously-motivated bitterness.

After California and Maine, why not go to the churches?

Maine repealed state recognition of same-sex marriage equality by popular vote yesterday, becoming the 31st state in the union to legally prohibit marriage equality.

But at this point, as the pro-LGBT equality groups wonder about how to turn this situation around – perhaps through more lobbying, more speeches, more marches, perhaps the most (or least) seasoned veterans in this struggle are realizing what their compatriots in California have observed since Proposition 8 last year: it’s the religious congregations which are at the very heart of ideological opposition to marriage equality in any part of the country, any part of the world.

So why can’t the churches be integrated?

Continue reading After California and Maine, why not go to the churches? →

Idea: Secessive referenda

 I have an idea for future referenda, at least on the state level:

If a state has a referendum/initiative and at least 30-40% of the registered voting residents of the state vote in favor of the losing opinion, then the areas in which the losing opinion is strongest should be guaranteed the right to secede from the state and not be subjected to the majority opinion.

I think that such a referendum would work best to settle acrimonious debates which split an entire population without resulting in bloodshed or violent disenfranchisement at the local level, as has happened in a large portion of referenda which have been held in the U.S. and other countries. I also think that it is a more procedural, cleaner process by which minorities’s opinions are protected from outright dismissal by a tyranny of the popular vote or tyranny of the court; we wouldn’t have to bring up such movements as that of KnowThyNeighbor.org and its anti-LGBT counterparts, and we wouldn’t have to hear the whinging of the other side over potential petitioner intimidation.

When peaceniks screed against Zionism

It’s rather unfortunate that those who take a pro-Palestinian/Arab side in the Arab-Israeli (or Arab-Hebrew) conflict have to equate Zionism to racism (or, more evidently, only anti-Arab culturism); ultimately, as with most other facets of the conflict, there is (and has almost always been) a risk of inflaming and tangiblizing religious passions even further, and at least most peaceniks hold off from directly criticizing or touching upon the role of religion in the conflict. As soon as one decides to utter the words "Khazaria" in one of their screeds, of when one becomes textually obsessed with the role of Maimonides and the Talmud in Jewish religion, I pretty much stop and desist from further reading.

However, I honestly don’t think that peaceniks who aren’t obsessed with the discrediting of the Jewish religion’s origins have fully addressed the issue of religious fundamentalism and its ties – on both sides – with a reductionist or eliminationist revanchism (that is, to vengefully regain the true width of the religious territory from the others – the infidels). (Semi-theocratic) Religious Zionism and (secular) Revisionist Zionism were both about getting the full breadth of the Land of Israel back from the Ottomans, British and Arabs, and both wings have played a prominent role in the history of hinterland settlement in or near areas of archaeologically-Jewish importance; the area of Jerusalem and Judea, in this case, is and has been at the forefront of revanchist politics since the earliest period of Zionism’s evolution as a diaspora, and later state and religious, ideology.

If peaceniks understood or saw the element of outwardly-lashing Jabotinskian and Kahanist revenge and rage within the settlement movement, I honestly could predict that they would see it in a different, more realistic light, albeit one that could still exhibit balance between the two sides of the conflict (and address the third, more ancient and rooted side: the Euro-Christian side).

My changing view on Israel’s evolution

For the record, I no longer hold the opinions of this earlier post, nor will I defend (or attempt to clarify, unless one asks) those words in any public or private discussion. It was written in the heat of the moment, and it now looks ignorant.

Anyway, I think that Israel is heading towards a binational architecture of government, or at least that’s what will happen with the further increase of Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria/West Bank. I also think that the Israeli government knows the inevitability of a binational architecture, which is why it is widely reputed in its own press scene for its encouragement of larger orthodox and Ultra-orthodox families (including Haredi and Religious Zionist) and higher orthodox birth rates; in short, Jewish religious fundamentalism (and all that is entailed, including "natural growth") is the government’s insurance against the Jewish/Hebrew culture being swamped by Arab/Muslim culture in the scenario of a binational Israel.

And who can blame them? A binational state seems to frighten those who fear the end and assimilation of the Jewish character of the state and its culture more so than those who move into the hinterland for religious (and apolitical) reasons. It would not be surprising to see a Gaza-West Bank-like split between the religious and non-religious Hebrew-speaking populations, with the Jerusalem-centric, hinterland-dwelling religious population remaining more dependent upon natural growth and the Tel Aviv-centric, coastal plain-dwelling non-religious population remaining dependent upon Aliyah from other countries.

For the Arabs who dwell within this new binational or federal state, the experience of delegated self-governance would remain centered in Samaria (where Ramallah is located), while the Arab experience in North District. They would have to deal and cooperate with a Hebrew-speaking resident minority in Samaria – one which is a naturally-growing mix of both religious and non-religious settlers – and would have to work out a suitable solution to access to ancient remains of Jewish civilization in Samaria while retaining or gaining equitable empowerment for the non-religious and orthodox Muslim Arab residents.

Jerusalem and Judea, on the other hand, is probably the most visibly and acerbically contentious portion of the entire conflict. Religious settlement in the Judean portion surrounding Jerusalem, and Haredization of the Jewish-majority portions of inner city Jerusalem, is obviously meant to tilt the demographic majority in the favor of Jewish fundamentalism and orthodoxy, neither of which have had as much of a historical dominance in Tel Aviv. This, of course, brings Israel and Judaism into direct conflict with the Islamic world and orthodox Islam, a demographically-skewed conflict for which Israel has long felt – at least since the Six Day War – woefully unprepared.

So perhaps Israel is delaying the binational solution until a solid Hebrew, Jewish fundamentalist majority is stacked into all sides and corners of Jerusalem and surrounding Judea. I doubt that such a majority will hold for long in the region after a full annexation and binationalization is instituted, since Judea is right next door to Jordan, but Israel has a shot at sowing the seed of the majority through Orthodox natural growth and religious immigration from the coastal plain region.

I surmise that it’ll take another two decades before the government finally annexes the West Bank and institutes binationalism as state policy.

Stallman, the Swedish Pirate Party, and copyleft

Reposted from original article on NowPublic.

A few days ago, Richard Stallman of the Free Software Foundation published an op-ed to the GNU project’s website, in which he criticized the copyright views of the Swedish Pirate Party, which had recently succeeded in its endeavor to get a seat in Brussels’ European Parliament a few months back. His main consternation with the PP’s goal of shortening the shelf life of copyright to just 5 years was that no exception has been vocally made by the party for the large body of free, libre and/or open source software (FLOSS) for which Stallman has served as a longtime ideological advocate; such software, which are licensed to allow for unencumbered, unfettered redistribution, modification and even commercialization (provided that the license granting such freedoms remains attached and intact when redistributed), have become increasingly popular in many sectors, including homes, schools and businesses due to their effective turning of the more familiar proprietary model of intellectual property law upon its head. 

However, this ideological split between a leading advocate of the spread of such freedoms, also known as "copyleft", and a rather small, young, populist outfit from Sweden reveals a much deeper rupture of ideological idiosyncracies that harkens back to the roots of the related, but separate struggles which are pursued by the two groups.

Richard Stallman (or "rms"), a Massachusetts-based software programmer, found his initial bearings within the Massachusetts Institute of Technology‘s "hacker" subculture in the 1970’s; contrary to our modern concept of a hacker as an antisocial trespasser who breaks into computer networks for any purpose, the hacker of the 1970s was a programmer who modified and functionally extended previously-published software for his or her own use and pleasure (akin to another modern concept, the "hack", which shows a lack of inelegance or originality, but instead uses the "shoulders" of others to create a modification that was not previously available but is otherwise very useful to a wider number of users). The subculture, which thrived in the wake of the 60’s hippie subculture, promoted a do-it-yourself/learn-from-your-neighbor attitude amongst its denizens, in which the knowledge to modify and extend the functionality of usually-proprietary computer software was publicly and mutually disseminated. However, Stallman also witnessed and protested the decline of MIT’s hacker subculture in the late 1970s as software publishers became more proactive in preventing the capability of third parties to redistribute and modify copies of their stringently-licensed software and their closely-guarded source code (the software programming concept of recipes in the culinary arts). After a momentous falling out with an MIT-based software startup, Stallman resigned from the institute in 1984, around the time when he announced his GNU project to mailing lists on ARPANET (the predecessor of the modern-day Internet); by 1985, Stallman had outlined his motivations for creating an operating system from scratch, one that would be both compatible with AT&T’s Unix operating system and licensed under "copyleft" stipulations that ensured that such-licensed software could be freely redistributed, modified and commercialized on a perpetually mutual basis. The same year, Stallman launched the Free Software Foundation, a non-profit advocacy group and think tank for his increasingly-popular definition of software freedom, but his GNU ("GNU’s Not Unix") operating system would languish in usage until 1991, when a Finnish computer science engineer by the name of Linus Torvalds began a project to create a kernel, or the very heart of an operating system. Following the combination of GNU with the Linux kernel, the free software movement was in full swing, amassing greater mindshare and greater ideological diversity throughout the 1990s and 2000s and resulting in the proliferation of free/open source software applications such as Firefox, Linux, Blender, Apache, Drupal and OpenOffice.org, but Richard Stallman has remained a stalwart advocate of the FSF’s "software freedom" and computer privacy, drawing strength from the semi-libertarian traditions of his hacker roots.

The Pirate Party of Sweden, however, arises out of more recent, more media-related circumstances. In 2003, Rasmus Fleischer, a Halmsted-born historian and musician, took part in the foundation of Piratbyrån ("Pirate Bureau"), a think tank that sought to improve the image of the controversial but popular and proliferating peer-to-peer file sharing networks and applications which had launched in the wake of the 2001 Napster trial in the United States; the same year, The Pirate Bay, a web-based index of hyperlinks to torrents, or files which download other, larger files through a decentralized network known as BitTorrent, was launched by members of the Piratbyrån. The Pirate Bay, which enjoyed immense popularity among both downloaders and uploaders of films, television series, books and software, became increasingly tangled with legal threats from a large number of corporations, most of whom accused The Pirate Bay of copyright infringement and depriving the corporations of the distribution monopoly to which they were entitled by intellectual property law; in early 2006, IT entrepreneur and former Microsoft employee Richard Falkvinge decided to harness the increasing public consciousness of file sharing by launching the amusingly-named Pirate Party, which advocates copyright reform through parliamentary legislation. While the Pirate Party is not associated with The Pirate Bay or Piratbyrån (and is, thus, not a political wing of the latter entities), all three organizations happened to share the same Internet servers; this one common tie between the three organizations was a key factor in the May 31, 2006 police raid on those servers (targeting the Pirate Bay’s operations), resulting in the shutdown of all three websites and leading to public demonstrations by members of the party’s youth wing, Young Pirate, at the server seizures and the arrests of Pirate Bay administrators. This preceded the 2006 parliamentary elections, in which the party participated, and it did not result in the party gaining the necessary 4% of the vote to send a member to the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament, but it did result in the larger parliamentary parties (the Green Party, the Moderate Party and the Liberal People’s Party) shifting their stances on copyright reform to incorporate many of the Pirate Party’s stances, primarily the ability to non-commercially share files without the looming threat of litigation over copyright infringement. Three years later, a full-fledged copyright infringement enablement court case was launched by the IFPI against the Pirate Bay administrators, resulting in a heavy loss for the Pirate Bay but resulting in a both a huge boost to the Pirate Party’s numbers, the winning of a seat in the European Parliament and the possibility of a more successful campaign in the 2010 Riksdag election. 

Thus, a proper appraisal of the two histories, the resulting ideologies, and the semi-coincidental intersections of interests is in order. Stallman, the FSF, and most FLOSS projects come from the perspective of the hacker, which places greater emphasis upon transparency and modifiability of source code (hence the idea of "open source") over the mere ability to redistribute various media over the Internet and other networks; Falkvinge, MEP Christian Engstrom, other PP and Piratbyrån members, and most BitTorrent tracker and search engine administrators are more concerned over the reform and liberalization of intellectual property law and practice in Sweden (and the European Union, if need be), and have not yet addressed the issue of source code availability for those who love to hack and modify in their spare time. Both groups want an end to the more litigious and tyrannical aspects of copyright law in the age of the Internet, where information of all sorts in all formats is more likely to be copied, shared and even remixed despite the agitations and ill will of corporations, but the two collectives, Stallman’s and Falkvinge’s, are heading in separate ideological directions which may mutually undercut each other’s best-intentioned efforts.

Ultimately, one group which may stand to benefit, or stand to suffer, from both collectives’ efforts is the Wikimedia Foundation, the parent organization of Wikipedia encyclopedia and the MediaWiki software distribution, which also runs the Wikimedia Commons, a freely-licensed media repository. The Commons database contains millions of images, video, and sounds, and receives contributions of media from private individuals, corporations and governments on a regular basis. However, it – and Wikipedia – most recently ran into trouble with the United Kingdom’s National Portrait Gallery over the high-resolution scanning and uploading of some 3,300 portraits from the gallery; such portraits are considered public domain in that their copyrights have expired in the United Kingdom, but English copyright law protects the museum’s right to prevent the distribution of high-resolution copies, even if the works in question are in public domain. As Wikipedia has itself become an ideological bastion of information and media freedom advocacy, such kerfuffles over copyright may make or break the free online encyclopedia, or at least its assumptions of fair use vs. free use; in such a monumental legal struggle, the Pirate Party and the Free Software Foundation possess a shared and mutually-vested interest.

SVG Transforms: Not competing with O3D

Per this thread, Apple/WebKit’s SVG Transforms are NOT competing or in the same area of interest as O3D. Instead, SVG Transforms (which incorporates WebKit’s CSS 2D and 3D Transforms, CSS Transitions and CSS Animations) is meant to display and interact with flat pieces of web content (in this case, the traditionally-2D SVG) in 2.5D/3D space, while O3D and WebGL are meant to display fully 2.5D/3D *scene graphs* and *models* separately from any web content (even though both efforts are aiming for an in-browser user experience).

Interestingly, Maciej mentions that it would be possible to codify a means to join arbitrary (2D/3D) web content and arbitrary 3D models together, but that it may be "a bigger challenge than anything that anyone has done so far".

So if this same argument could also be applied to other related initiatives in both fields, from canvas(3D) to X3D, then I’m assuming that the next frontier for the 3D Web initiatives to cross is how to bridge the divide of perception between 3D and 2D in the same network-centric application. Certainly, the fact that most of us do not have 3D-ready navigation hardware (like the SpaceNavigator) is a core part of that dialogue over why the 3D Web initiatives are not scaling to better expectations of ease of use and accessibility (not to mention hardware acceleration of graphics).

So O3D or WebGL may have a future in the web browser (or at least a better one than VRML and X3D), but its not like we’re that much closer to bridging the gap between 3D web content and 3D scene content.