I saw a bit of the DLC’s Washington meeting today.

Watching it made me think about the Green Party, and it made me wonder if the GPUSA will ever take on the “big tent” philosophy that is characteristic of the Democratic Party (and, increasingly less, the Republican Party).

Also, it made me wonder if there is a connection between the US’s presidential/gubernatorial, winner-take-all-the-executive-branch system (vs. the parliamentary systems in use in other countries) and the tendency for two parties to converge as the duopolies of perceivably-winged ideologies, with the Democrats taking the center-left and the Republicans taking the center-right.

In most of the stereotypical parliamentary- or semi-presidential-system democracies (Canada, UK, France, Russia), there tend to be at least 3 or 4 parties represented significantly in the parliament, with at least two of them taking command of the center-left or center-right ideological positions (thus guaranteeing them the chances to run the “government”, or the cabinet); those parties which are on the fringe of either position are there to primarily force an ideological position that runs counter to the governing party’s position or practices.

In the US, however, there are only two parties which matter in political discourse, even in the legislative branch; other parties, known as third parties, serve only a purpose of a “dumping bin” for the “votes of conscience” which cannot consider the main two parties because their tents are not big enough to hold any more ideological input than is the flavor of the day.

Why is it so different?

Well, compared to most other countries, the US political system places a great deal of emphasis on the executive branch at all levels; you don’t hear about third parties like the Greens, Libertarians or Constitution party until the presidential election year, not during the midterms. Everybody wants to become president or governor or mayor, and senators are accorded a semi-presidential status of recognition; representatives, on the other hand, carry less weight of popular influence or recognition.

But I think that this also plays into the duopoly that is in force: because the executive, which is functionally separate from the legislative (unlike in parliamentary systems) is supposed to govern “fairly”, the executive is mostly a non-ideological position that is up for grabs from whoever can attract the widest degree of votes from across ideologies and regions; the same applies to senators, since there are only two senators from each state and, thus, a candidate for senator must reach across regions and appeal to various ideologies within their constituent states.

Representatives, on the other hand, tend to reflect and represent a wider and more detailed spectrum of ideology, since such persons are elected from more specific local areas within a state, where the ideological positions of the representative may enjoy a higher popularity in their own constituency than in the state or union at large. It is from the House that we get such individuals as Pelosi, Paul, Wu and Lee, among other colorful figures.

My view, for the moment, is that the only reason why there aren’t any third parties represented in the House is because of a combination of the greater emphasis on who wins the White House or the other side of the Hill and the lack of decision-making power of the House in comparison to other lower houses in other countries (the largest party in which gets to form the government or coalition cabinet). This greater concern for the relatively-non-ideologically-specific executive and semi-executive by the populace rubs-off on both the HoR’s party makeup and the duopoly of the Democrats and Republicans (who are now reflections of the winner-take-all-the-executive-and-semi-executive-branches) at all levels of government.

Now, is this a good thing?

I’m asking this to wonder if the focus of the duopoly on the executive and semi-executive leaves room for the HoR members’ own focus on personal/local ideology (only using the party of choice as a “name brand”) rather than “impartial” vote attainment.

In the parliamentary democracies, the majority parties in power in the lower house, in order to keep from calling a new election, often struggle to create their own big tents by welcoming a wide degree of ideology, sometimes forming alliances and dealbrokered electoral blocs with parties who share very little in common with the core parliamentary constituency of the governing party. Thus, parliamentarians and parliamentary party leaders are often accused of pandering to votes rather than ideologically-driven programs.

So since the “vote-pandering” accusation is less common to cite in this country’s lower house(s), what does it mean for the Green Party that wants its foot in the federal door so badly? Third parties like the Greens are, or seem, less likely to go for the vote-pandering tactic, since the Greens already have a set core of positions on a limited subset of ideology; they’re also not well known by the candidates that they’ve backed (except for Ralph Nader, formerly), so no name-brand to use to one’s electoral advantage.

But if the Greens want to get their foot in the door (that is, into the executive and semi-executive), does it mean that they will have to become more like the Democrats and Republicans by shying away from their core ideological positions and pander to a wider degree of votes?

And does it mean that, if the Greens do manage to get their foot into the door, the effect will allow for the Greens’ own ideologues (including, I’m sure, a few small-l libertarians who may not be as overjoyed for restrictions on free enterprise for environmental safety purposes) to win local constituencies for the HoR?